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Analysis on the game of regional innovation system

Author: NiuPanQiang XieFuJi From: www.yourpaper.net Posted: 2010-07-06 20:18:53 Read:
Keywords: the regional innovation system   game theory; innovation innovation mechanism of
Abstract: regional innovation system since 1992 has been put forward has been valued by many scholars, but with the game theory research tool on regional innovation system is still not comprehensive and system.Mainly from the regional innovation system innovation subject relationship, two aspects of innovation mechanism of regional innovation system, analyzes the game method of theory, in order to provide a reference for follow-up researchers.
Regional innovation system (regionalinnovationsystem, RIS) concept was first developed by British scholar Cooke (PhilipNicholasCooke) was proposed in 1992, is from the system, dynamic, evolutionary view the new regional science of system, culture, organizational factors and innovation research, analysis of the impact of environment, organization and system of regional innovation, in order to explain the regional innovation and economic development potential.Game theory is a mathematical method and logic research subject interaction behavior decision theory, is an important tool in today's economy, management research.The game theory studies the introduction of regional innovation system will contribute to the analysis of innovation cooperation, have certain help to further understand the regional innovation mechanism.Research in this area at home and abroad, although many, but not all, the lack of a systematic theory, the theory of regional innovation system in this paper, the game method of the review, it would be useful for researchers.
Analysis of 1 on the innovation of the regional innovation system game
Game 1.1 between enterprises
The enterprise is the core of the regional innovation system, research about the game between the enterprise innovation system is mainly divided into three categories: the game between the innovative enterprise and imitate type enterprise; game between domestic enterprises and foreign enterprises; game cooperation innovation enterprises ask.
(1) the first and the creation of enterprise game
Enterprise technology innovation strategy is mainly divided into three kinds: independent innovation strategy (or leading strategy), joint innovation strategy and innovation strategy (Freeman, 1982), in which the strategy of independent innovation and imitation innovation strategy is most common.The choice of which strategy is the enterprise technology innovation, need to be analysed from the aspects of enterprise's innovation ability and the innovation cost.Most of the existing literature (Segerstrom, 1991; Muniagurria, 1997; ChengL, Singh, K, TaoZhigang, 1999) are considered a single enterprises independent innovation and imitation innovation strategy for themselves and the society, the game is a static game types.However, from the market point of view, the individual enterprise engaged in innovation may cause waste of resources, so that the whole market output efficiency is very low, the research and development costs are high, and the technical progress is not soon (Dsagupta, Stiglitz, 1981), so in this case, the static game theory can not explain the rules.Evolutionary game theory has certain advantages in population trend analysis, and dynamic, to help solve the initiative and imitation business game problems, such as easy to Yu Yin, Sheng Zhao-han, Xiao Tiaojun (2005) study the use of evolutionary game theory analysis of independent innovation independent innovation investment of enterprise, points out that in certain under the condition, independent innovation investment market in the proportion of enterprises and the market structure will be evolutionary stable.
(2) the game of domestic and foreign enterprises
When faced with their own production technology level difference is not big but have the scale and brand advantages of foreign enterprises, specific strategies of technological innovation of enterprises affected by the existing common technical and cost impact of technological innovation, which is the basis of slightly the game with the foreign enterprises of building technology innovation strategy.In order to seize the market, foreign enterprises generally use scale, brand take expansion strategy, to maximize the country enterprises are always the pursuit of profit.Research in this area has such as Guo Zhaoyang (2006) through the market reaction to establish the domestic, foreign enterprises function concluded: "as long as the host country enterprises without technology innovation, whether foreign enterprise technology innovation or not, the competition is the inevitable result of our country enterprise losses and squeezed out of the market; the host country enterprise technology innovation ability to obtain a certain profit and market share, it depends on the enterprises of the two sides both the technical level and technical innovation of the advanced level.".Limitations of this study at home and abroad enterprises game performance in: use at the same time choice game model strategy of static one, without considering the competition between the strategy choice of dynamic and information asymmetry.
(3) the enterprise cooperative innovation game
The integration and innovation of the process involves various institutions and various resources, for individual enterprises, the whole innovation process risks and costs are higher, therefore, enterprises of cooperative innovation is becoming more and more common, and provides an effective platform for the cooperation of regional innovation system, the innovation subject especially among enterprises cooperate to form a network structure.Although the network structure can disperse risk, improve the innovation rate, but the network members in the cooperation is also facing the risk, as Harrison and Bennett (1994) pointed out, the network is a "double-edged sword", for a specific enterprise, private colleges have information as private assets, these are the value of the information once exposed, the commercial opportunity is greatly reduced, thus undermining their search for new information and knowledge sharing initiative consciousness.Therefore, the relationship between risk caused by contact between members of the cooperation will lead to reduced, resulting in knowledge flow is not smooth, affect the stability of cooperation network and regional innovation system.As Yang Jian (2007) using game method research of innovation subject relationship risk was pointed out, the relational risk will contact each other and the relationship between failure in regional innovation system and the innovation main body, lead to cooperation network structure is loose between innovation subjects and even difficult to form, eventually making the regional innovation system due to the cooperative behavior, knowledge reduction the flow is blocked and gradually declined.
The game between 1.2 enterprises and government.
In the regional innovation system, enterprises are the main body of innovation, but the government encourage and promote enterprise innovation role can not be ignored, the innovation of university-industry relations three triple helix model (Etzkowitz, Leydesdorff, Leydesdorf, 1995; Etzkowitz, 1998) is the role of government to equally important position, industry and university.Enterprises and government are two different types of organizations, enterprises generally seek to maximize the company or the shareholders' interests, and the government's goal is more complex, in addition to providing services for the regional economic development, government officials, their interests are often in their consideration.Therefore, in the regional innovation system, the game business and government usually have a cooperative game and non-cooperative game.Although the market mechanism as a "invisible hand" in the technical innovation, regional innovation plays a very important role, but the market mechanism is sometimes there are some failure, market mechanisms such as monopoly in individual enterprise innovation under the condition of not suitable for resource mobilization, and for high risk simply by market mechanism innovation activities to succeed, then you need to directly or indirectly involved in the government.Zhao Huifang, Li Chuanjun (2003) studied in this enterprise and government under the condition of different utility, the game in the investment decision-making in technological innovation.In addition, the game model used in the rent-seeking problem, research on government mechanism design problem, also has certain applicability study on the relationship between enterprises and government in the regional innovation system.
Game 1.3 between governments
The current research about the game between governments of the government as a rational economic man, because most of the game model is built on the players are rational economic man based on.Gold Taijun, Yuan Jianjun (2005) studies the government between the upper and lower levels of the game, the game model of government and the local government from the middle upper government, the complete information static game, the conclusion is in the regional innovation system, one of the existing local government innovation problem is "pseudo innovation".Xiao Ming (2007) on the game problem of government between cooperation and competition, he believes that in China's current economic system, the provincial government has considerable economic activity regulation and economic results of usufruct, competition and cooperation coexist at the same time of two kinds of game equilibrium between the provincial government, the process of game to which direction depending on the cooperation can create additional value and participant behavior.Lan Haixia (2007) to the main government administrative region as the region of interest, that the government of the administrative district, there are two strategies for cooperation and protection, according to the Nash equilibrium analysis, (protection, protection) is a Nash equilibrium solution of the game, this is a kind of "prisoner's dilemma", the reason is the local government to pursue their own interests the results, thereby generating individual rationality leads to collective irrationality, root system in the existing system is not reasonable, only by the government
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