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Ultimatum game

Author: ZhongGaoZuo From: www.yourpaper.net Posted: 2009-11-01 00:11:54 Read:
Abstract: In the game with the interests of small shareholders, the largest shareholder through the control of the Board of Directors to master the right of initiative in a strong position, and can take this shareholders' meeting the legitimate right to enjoy the fair, encroaching on the interests of minority shareholders. Government and relevant departments must speed up the construction of the corresponding system, strengthen the social responsibility of large shareholders, strengthen the board of directors' fiduciary responsibility to all shareholders, and earnestly safeguard the good the fairness of the securities market.
Keywords: ultimatum game; proposed rights; split share structure reform; social responsibility

After the share reform, the size of the non-legally acquired distribution rights, the regulatory department again its free flow restrictions must have great courage and wisdom. The problem is that the investors for their unfair share reform program, why was not strongly opposed, but overwhelmingly passed.

Ultimatum game predicament

(A) scouring the ultimatum game balanced and fair
The ultimatum game is an extremely simplified game model: a proponent and a response by m yuan in trading income value bargain. Proponent bids $ x (0 The prevailing view is that the proposers and respondents will each receive half of the income the value of the bid is fair. Respondents in line to the proponent the subgame the scouring Nash equilibrium bid is not satisfied, because this bid is clearly unfair.
(B) the conclusion of experimental economics
Way to allocate a certain number of proposers and respondents bonus, Gth Schmittberger and Schwarze (1982), a pioneer in the ultimatum game experiments, the results from the experimental point of view, the proponent average 37% of the total prize money distributed to the respondents, and nearly 50% of the respondents rejected the only bid proponent of less than 20% of the total prize money. Subsequently the up Roth, Prasnikar okuno-fujiwara, and Zamir (1991), Bolton and a Zwick (1995), Croson (1996), Larrick and Blount (1997), Slonim and Roth (1998), Camerom (1999) and the List Cherry (2000), Eckel and Grossman (2001) have also carried out experiments. In these experiments, the average bid the highest level is Roth Prasnikar okuno-fujiwara and Zamir experiment, the proponent of an average 45% of the total prize money distributed to the respondents. The average bid the lowest levels of Bolton and Zwick experimental proponent average only 23% of the total prize money given to respondents. Proponent's bid, the respondents refused highest level experimental Bolton and Zwick, 35% of the bid respondents refused respondents declined to the lowest level of Eckel and Grossman experiment, only 12% of the bid respondents rejected. In these experiments, rarely more than 50% of the total prize money or only rarely bonuses to bid to the respondents. Forsythe (1994) Another type is called a dictator game experiment to compare with the ultimatum game, dictator game, the response of the respondents do not need the proponent of any bid, the result is a proponent or an average bonus 20% of the total amount distributed to the respondents, although the proponent and give each other bonuses less than to be in the ultimatum game.

Through these experiments, the general conclusion is that the equitable factors are indeed important factors to affect the game both sides strategy selection. Ultimatum game, proposers rarely Game concise indication of the Nash equilibrium strategy bid by sub respondents for unfair bid also showed the need to sacrifice their own interests to choose to reject () on the proponent of inequitable conduct punishment (the proponent lost more benefits). The dictator game The proponent also consider the bid is fair, rather than absolute individual rationality, although the proponent of the right to do so and will not be punished by respondents.
(C) persists plight
For the ultimatum game, Although experiments have shown that out of fairness, the vast majority of the proponent and not by sub-strategy game refined the Nash equilibrium indicating the lowest price, but to the interests of the respondents, some respondents also showed the courage to be unfair bid rejected, but the data of the experimental results also confirmed the proponent will not because to be fair to give up their own interests, the average bid the highest level in 45% of the lowest in the experiment only to 23% of the total bonus points to respondents, rarely higher than 50% of the bid fully illustrates this point. Unfair bids respondents is not always reject the contrary, in the experiment, all bids up only 35% of the respondents were refused, the lowest only 12% of the bid is to respond to those who reject the fact Description unfair bid, respondents mostly chose to accept, unless the proponent's bid is too unfair. Second, the strong position of large shareholders

(A) a majority shareholder proposal right
AG is the highest form of modern business enterprise system to take the corporate governance structure, all shareholders are only the nominal owners of the company, but the largest shareholder through the election of directors to the board, to become the company's actual controller. The board of directors of various motion reflects the will of the shareholders. From this point in the game of major shareholders and the interests of small shareholders, large shareholders to master the right to proposals, is a proponent of the game in the distribution of benefits. Bound by the Companies Act, the board of directors of major motion to be submitted to the general meeting by, especially those directly related to the motion of large shareholders and minority shareholders 'interests conflict, major shareholders need to avoid the vote of the shareholders' meeting, the small and medium-sized shareholders completely ultimatum status of the respondents in the game. Small and medium-sized shareholders vote against the board of directors and major shareholders need to seriously consider the problem.
(B) small and medium-sized shareholders choose
Well known that in the interests of the game, with the major shareholders, minority shareholders is completely vulnerable groups, the largest shareholder with the Board as respondents in the ultimatum game, to the proposal of their own interests, is not fair, medium and small shareholders how can I do. After the motion after the packaging of the interests of minority shareholders of temptation, to punish large shareholders vote against the unfair behavior is also in punishment themselves. The face of the major shareholders of sponsoring the distribution of benefits, as long as it is not absolutely unfair, minority shareholders can only passively bear. Throughout the A-share market, the few proposals of the board of directors at the shareholders' general meeting on small and medium-sized shareholders veto is proof. The status of the respondents in the game has decided the unfair situation of small and medium investors to abandon the wise choice of the small and medium investors to participate in the general meeting and change voting with their feet. Small investors as the main stock market, investment alienation speculation, shareholders its inevitable alienation for the shareholders.
(C) the role of general meetings
The shareholders' meeting is a basic institutional arrangements the shareholders exercised owners the power to safeguard the interests of the owner. However, the significance of this one share one vote democratic decision-making system for small and medium-sized shareholders Fundamentally there is only one, is the spokesperson for the Board becomes the largest shareholder or shareholders will for the will of all the shareholders, seeking to small and medium through which shareholders of Big shareholders and shareholders control the board ultimately can only be futile. The role of the general meeting of shareholders is the control of the Board of Directors of the major shareholders or major shareholders want to do legalization, although these things may not be fair, could harm the interests of minority shareholders. Any system has its flaws, the experimental results from the ultimatum game can reasonably infer that the protection of the interests of small investors ultimately need to rely on the conscience of the major shareholders or major shareholders control of the Board of Directors.

Equity division reform cases analysis

Large shareholders and minority shareholders' interests of the game in the stock market is the most obvious is the issue of new shares, the additional placement of shares, related party transactions, restructuring and mergers and acquisitions, profit distribution and other areas. Sany Heavy Industry, Shanghai Pudong Development Bank, Baosteel, Meiling, Shanghai Petrochemical several listed companies, we chose a case analysis. The following table lists the basic situation of these companies tradable shareholders to participate in the voting share reform.
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