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Corporate governance-oriented accounting information disclosure control mode

Author: ZhangWuXin From: www.yourpaper.net Posted: 2009-04-01 00:24:17 Read:
[Abstract] accounting information disclosure by mitigating information asymmetry between management and investors, effectively inhibit the management of opportunistic behavior, and thus plays a fundamental role in the corporate governance mechanism. On this basis, a balanced understanding of the accounting information disclosed on the balance of the accounting information needed to meet the corporate governance disclosure quality. Due to the presence of contract costs, information costs, as well as third-party audit failure, the market can not achieve the equilibrium of the disclosure of accounting information, government regulation is necessary to protect the disclosure of accounting information quality means. In China's socialist market economy, drawing on international experience, sound corporate governance-oriented accounting information disclosure system of government control, has a very important role in ensuring the quality of accounting information, improve corporate governance mechanisms and improve the efficiency of capital markets.
[] Corporate Governance accounting information disclosure of government control

I. Introduction

The role of accounting information disclosure system in corporate governance is that it can ease between management and investors (shareholders and creditors), as well as between the controlling shareholders and other investors information asymmetries to suppress the management opportunism behavior. In the modern market economy environment, both internal corporate governance mechanisms or outside the company governance mechanism to play its role can not be separated from the high-quality accounting information. Thus, the establishment of a set of institutional arrangements to ensure the quality of accounting information is essential for improving the efficiency of corporate governance. In the neo-classical economic theory, which is not a problem. In honesty companies can find a dishonest company to distinguish on the basis of market equilibrium model of neoclassical economics, which helps customers and investors on the products of the company engaged in opportunistic behavior a suitable punch lemon Discounts and securities. However, Akerlof stressed in real life, there is another possibility, that is, when the reliability of the information is difficult to be confirmed, not honest behavior dishonesty expelled from the market, but, on the contrary, dishonesty The honest behavior behavior will be expelled from the market. This phenomenon in terms of the securities markets in developed countries, is still underdeveloped in China's stock market have occurred.
Therefore, disclosure of accounting information the core issue of the national securities market regulation, national corporate governance principles and norms important content. China's market is still not perfect conditions, give full play to the role of government regulation, has important practical significance for improving the quality of accounting information to improve corporate governance mechanisms and improve the efficiency of the securities market. By government regulation to ensure that the disclosure of the information is true to the market, thereby increasing public trust in the fair market, which will help deepen the degree of marketization. This article will focus on the information disclosure system and the relationship of the corporate governance mechanism, focused on the regulatory role of the government to ensure the quality of accounting information.

Second, the disclosure of accounting information to the basic role in corporate governance

Berle and Means and his followers believe that almost all dispersed ownership of large companies by professional managers to manage and control the separation of ownership and management rights will lead to the staff of the manager of the company contrary to the interests of the shareholders of moral hazard. In view of this situation, we must establish a set of constraints on managers and motivate corporate governance mechanism. Corporate governance mechanisms play a role in the premise of investors to be able to fully understand the operation and value of the company concerned. Accounting information disclosure is one of the corporate governance mechanisms play a role in an important foundation for its role in corporate governance is mainly manifested in the following aspects.
A role in the monitoring and evaluation mechanisms
The enterprise market is considered to be a special contract between the human capital and non-human capital. Human Capital characteristics determine the importance of monitoring, evaluation managers. Human capital and its owner can not be separated, it does not have a mortgage. Therefore, with respect to the the pledged financial capital investors, which means that the owner of human capital less reliable and easy "lazy" also means that the owner of human capital. In other words, managers can not only by "lazy" to improve their effectiveness, but also through the "abuse" non-human capital to make their own benefit. If the owner of human capital incentives and constraints, then the non-human capital even need a guardian. In practice, the disclosure of accounting information system will play the role of guardian. Contracting investors in order to achieve its financial capital coverage on the behavior of the managers to monitor, it is necessary to rely on the company's annual report, reporting and ad hoc announcements disclosed accounting information. Similarly, investors also inseparable from the manager of the ex-post evaluation of accounting information. Investors through the accounting information on the company's results of operations and the personal ability of managers to evaluate, in order to increase the stakes in the next negotiations, improve corporate governance mechanism. Therefore, the accounting information is the basis of the monitoring and evaluation manager.
2, in reward incentives
Play the role of human capital carried by individuals, there is a big uncertainty. Therefore, human capital can only incentive can not be pressed. In order to achieve incentive compatibility, so that managers share a portion of the residual claim is efficient. The highly integrated accounting information naturally become the basis for the design and implementation of incentive contracts. In practice, most managers payment incentive program design and implementation is based on net earnings and stock price-based standard. Teller 1993-1994 317 the company's annual bonus plan survey results show that there are 312 in the bonus plan at least an accounting profit targets, and financial results-based bonus the proportion of expenditure accounted for 86.6%. Although the study also found that nearly 30 years, the accounting profit indicators in determining the entire executive compensation incentive plan, increasing the proportion of small, but if only the price as the measure of executives effort indicators, will be subject to a number of executives the interference factors beyond the control of, lead to "noise" in the incentive contract. If the net income as one of the benchmarks of incentives will help reduce the impact of this "noise". The Buxi Man and Yin Jie Jikan people also argue the point. Holmstrom in their relative performance evaluation (RPE) program, also taking into account the role of financial and accounting information in the incentive contract, the difference is, RPE industry risks faced by the company to filter out, so that the senior management efforts can be more fully expressed by the financial accounting results. Since the 1990s, theorists value of economic value added (EVA) and the economic value of the correction value added (REVA) to design management as a new performance base remuneration. These two indicators are still related adjustments on the basis of accounting profit. Visible, accounting information is the basis for incentive mechanism design and implementation.
3, the role in the control of the configuration
For control of the configuration is the key issues addressed by the corporate governance structure, and it has a state of dependency. Assume that x is the total revenue of the enterprise, v is the shareholders minimum expected return, w wages for the worker's contract, r is the creditor's contract revenue. If w r x 4, in the capital markets, the role of the manager of market mechanisms
The managers always want companies to get investment from the capital market, investors in determining its financial capital through the capital market will be delivered to the company, need the help of accounting information selected for the evaluation of the manager's level of effort and behavior, in order to make the right investment decisions. If investors realized or other investors investment is being abused, they will be used with caution own investment or a rate of return sufficient to compensate for this expected risk. Visible, capital markets play a role can not be separated from the disclosure of accounting information. Similarly, the market manager role is also inseparable from the disclosure of accounting information. The manager market constitutes a constraint manager behavior external pressure. If the manager wants to change jobs in the current position on the history may become a decisive factor.

Third, the disclosure of accounting information in the role of government regulation

Some literature on the quantity and quality of accounting information disclosure equilibrium is defined to meet the needs of the community balance. From the above, the so-called social needs, mainly from the various stakeholders, and the number of indicators included in the quality, because other things being equal, the disclosure of the number means that there is a relatively high quality of disclosure. Therefore, the equilibrium of the disclosure of accounting information, understanding the balance of the accounting information needed to meet the corporate governance disclosure quality.
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