Welcome to free paper download website

On shareholding structure of listed companies in China problem

Author: HuangZhen From: www.yourpaper.net Posted: 2007-11-20 17:12:59 Read:
The shareholding structure of the problem is an important part of the governance structure of listed companies. International experience shows that in the early stages of development of the stock market, individual investors in a larger proportion of the company's shareholding structure. With the development of the securities market, institutional investors gradually be nurtured, especially the growth of mutual funds, pension funds, life insurance funds, investment banks and other securities intermediaries have a significant effect on the formation of institutional investors. In this paper, based on the shareholding structure of the theory, and the combination of foreign shareholding structure of listed companies in China to talk about personal opinion.
the , shareholding structure of the status quo of the world
Throughout the world, there are three different shareholding structure of the model, that is the mode of the United States and Britain, Japan, Germany, mode and East Asia, Latin America Model. In the mode of the United States and Britain, the company's ownership is more dispersed, and the modern company ownership and management separation dispersed shareholders can not effectively monitor the activities of the management company's actual controller of the company's business. In the case of internal restraint mechanism is relatively weak, to be controlled mainly by the external monitor. In the mode of Japan, Germany, the company's equity is more concentrated, the bank has played a huge role in financing and corporate governance. Mode in East Asia, Latin America, the company's equity is concentrated in the hands of the family, these families are generally involved in the company's management and investment decisions. Therefore, the core of corporate governance from the conflict of interests between management and shareholders into the controlling shareholder, the conflict of interest between managers and middle and small shareholders.
Second, the shareholding structure of the theory and practice
Has been highly fragmented equity is regarded as the fundamental starting point for the study of corporate governance, but the actual is not the case. Due to the presence of the three shareholding structure mode, ownership concentration is relatively common. Therefore, the ownership structure of corporate governance and performance will have two opposite effects, the effect of convergence of interest and Tunneling effect.
The effect of convergence of interest supporters believe that the price increases brought wealth to the controlling shareholders and the interests of small shareholders converge. In this case, the controlling shareholder of both motivation to pursue to maximize the value of the company, but also the ability of the management of enterprises to exert sufficient control to achieve their own interests, to better solve the traditional agency problem, and thus the equity centralized company with respect to the shares loose dispersed companies to have higher profitability and market performance.
Seize the benefits of effect Supporters argue that between the interests of the controlling shareholder interests and external minority shareholders are often not consistent, there may be a serious conflict of interest between the two. Control in the absence of external threats, or the type of outside shareholders is more diversified, the controlling shareholder may be at the expense of the interests of the other shareholders to pursue their own interests to maximize. At this point, the company's performance and market value of equity dispersed superior to the concentration of ownership of the company.
Scholars an empirical study of the shareholding structure of listed companies in China, to come to this conclusion: dispersed ownership-performance of listed companies is superior to the listed companies of the legal person controlling type, and the type of legal person controlling performance of listed companies and excellent the state-owned holding listed companies. It can be said that in our country, seize the benefits of effect is very clear.
, China's current shareholding structure of the existing problems
(A) listed companies in China due to the dominance problem.
In the case of perfect capital markets, even if most of the hands of investors holding only a small number of company stock, they can also be used to "vote with their feet" way to express dissatisfaction with the poor performance of the company, because the market circulation of stock accounting for most of the listed company's share capital. The situation in China is some special equity interest in China's listed companies of artificially divided for the state-owned shares, legal person shares and circulation of shares, non-tradable shares of state-owned shares and legal person shares of large accounts for about a 60 to 70% of the equity interest in the listed company has absolutely the control over, is typical of "dominance" phenomenon. According to statistics, the number of listed companies in China's 1000, the highest stake of state-owned shares were as high as 84.98% (Shanghai) and 88.58% (D), more than 50% in about 40% of listed companies, state-owned shareholders, major shareholders in state-owned shares and legal person shares an overwhelming majority, a considerable part of the corporate shareholder is state-controlled. This situation obviously can not meet the needs of China's state-owned enterprise reform and development of the securities market, it is difficult to achieve reasonably efficient allocation of social resources and the effective value-added of state-owned assets.
So many shares have been centralized control, the negative effect is obvious. On the one hand, from the listed company, the shareholder can use their position to the entire company together their own pockets, to form the related party transactions; On the other hand, from a market point of view, tradable state-owned shares can not, therefore, tradable shares in the secondary market too small, so you can be the main control and manipulate the movements of the stock price, the company's financial indicators lose its meaning, the price-earnings ratio changes so rapidly, it is difficult to truly reflect the operation of enterprises.
(B) the phenomenon of internal control of listed companies is very serious.
The modern theory of the firm between owners and managers (internal) essentially is a principal-agent relationship, the two sides have different utility goals, as rational economic men are trying to make their own for maximum effectiveness. When the absence of owners, or its objectives irrational, from the company's external and internal monitoring of the behavior of operators is out of control, internal control appeared. For our specific case, the author tries to make the following analysis. the 1 in many of our listed companies, state-owned shares has a controlling position, but the real control is an agent of the state-owned shares, they will in fact exercise ultimate control over the company, and small and medium-sized shareholders even buy a company's stock market, can not obtain control of the listed company, so often there will be a final say, "is not conducive to investment diversification and the formation of a multi-property rights of checks and balances, difficult to form a truly modern enterprise system. At the same time, a substantial majority of the managers of state-owned assets, on the one hand, do not know how the company's business and no say in how to run the company; On the other hand, there is no real exercise to manage state-owned assets management of human, material and intelligence. In this way, the company's Board of Directors and the Supervisory Board will lose the value of existence.
In the corporate governance structure, the Board has an important role and should play an important role in the supervision of operators. In many of our listed companies, the general manager is the company's chairman or not the chairman of the board, but also an important member of the Board, so that, the company's shareholders' meeting, the Board can not really play the manager of the company's control . According to statistics, the members of the board of directors of listed companies in China, 100% of inside directors of companies accounted for 22.1% of the number of valid samples, more than 50% of inside directors of companies accounted for 78.2% of the number of valid samples, Chairman and General Manager the same individual companies accounted for 47.7% of the number of valid samples.
Through the above analysis can know, the shareholding structure of our country belongs to ownership concentration, this concentration is not conducive to the development of enterprises, it is difficult to protect the interests of small investors. Many of our listed companies is actually a subsidiary of the controlling shareholder and related party transactions between the major shareholders of listed companies, and even listed companies as an "ATM", in this case, the controlling shareholder of the occupation of the capital of the listed company, against the interests of medium and small shareholders are common occurrences. "Monkey King", "39 medicine" like some time before the stock market shock events, especially the 39 pharmaceutical, major shareholders actually be able to take away 95% of the net assets of the listed companies. Visible, the shareholding structure of the problem, has seriously affected the healthy development of the securities market.
, ownership structure optimization recommendations
(A) state-owned shares and legal person shares in circulation.
State-owned shares is a difficult problem plagued the further development of China's stock market, its large scale, involving a wide range solved properly or not, have a profound impact on the securities market and the whole economy will be. Western countries the beginning of the reform of state-owned enterprises to varying degrees there is inefficient, the phenomenon of loss and lack of competitiveness. These countries mainstream economists believe that is closely related to the problem of low efficiency of state-owned enterprises with its own system of property rights. It reduced the proportion or completely withdraw, help to optimize the ownership structure, eliminating the institutional shortcomings of unclear property rights of state-owned shares, creating operational mechanisms to adapt to market competition through the reduction of state-owned shares. To improve the competitiveness of enterprises is a very important objective for countries in the implementation of state-owned shares.
 1/2    1 2 Next Last
Please consciously abide by Internet-related policies and regulations.
Tips: Log in to comment, the user name to enter comments directly from your personal space, so that more friends to meet you.

Sponsored Links

Sponsored Links

Top